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Abstract A recent debate over the causal foundations of evolutionary theory pits those
who believe that natural selection causally explains long-term, adaptive population change
against those who do not. In this paper, I argue that this debate – far from being an invention
of several articles in 2002 – dates from our very first engagements with evolution as a quan-
tified, statistical science. Further, when we analyze that history, we see that a pivotal figure
in the early use of statistical methodology in evolutionary theory, W.F.R. Weldon (1860–
1906), changes his mind about precisely the central claim at issue. I close by drawing some
morals which I think the case can offer for the contemporary debate going forward.
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1 Introduction
Consider a simplistic, cartoon presentation of evolution by natural selection. At the popula-
tion level, we have fitness values for traits – somehow, at a minimum, indices of the traits’
aptness for the environment or success at copying themselves into future generations, though
the details are infamously difficult to work out (Ariew and Lewontin 2004; Sober 2013;
Pence and Ramsey 2015) – which are taken to explain and/or predict (at least some subset
of) changes in populations over time. Additionally, we can introduce an understanding of
this change at the level of individual organisms. As is often discussed in the philosophy of
biology literature (Mills and Beatty 1979; Brandon 1990; Pence and Ramsey 2013), partic-
ular individuals have propensities to survive and reproduce, and these are taken to explain
and/or predict (at least some subset of) changes in the properties of the lineages of those
individuals – with some lineages being more successful than others.
This is roughly the extent of current consensus, and it should be clear already that our
picture leaves us with a dramatically underspecified interpretation of evolutionary theory as
a whole. First and foremost, the individual and population levels are at minimum connected
by a composition relationship – populations are made up of individuals. This means that
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we should expect some account of further connections between the two levels of our story:
between the individual propensities to survive and reproduce and trait fitnesses, between
lineage structure change and population change, and between the explanations themselves
offered at the individual level and those at the population level. Or, if those explanations are
absent, we need an argument that tells us why. Lastly, we have yet to specify anything about
how the proffered explanations at each level actually work. Are they causal, or no? If yes,
which account of causal explanation is most perspicuous in this context?
Answers to all of these questions have tended to cluster into two groups. First, we
have the “statisticalist” interpretation, a position inaugurated in the contemporary context
by Walsh et al (2002) and Matthen and Ariew (2002). While there has been disagreement
among these authors as to the details of the program, I will take the position of Walsh et al
(2017) as definitive. On this view, precisely what makes natural selection interesting – in
a manner analogous to statistical physics – is that explanations of population phenomena
are insensitive to the details of individual phenomena. On the statisticalist picture, selection
picks out a set of facts at the population level (namely, certain kinds of population arrange-
ments, with certain kinds of growth rates, i.e., trait fitnesses, assigned to their parts), which,
when they obtain, entail certain kinds of future population change as an analytic conse-
quence. This thus offers us a specification of the connections between levels (or rather, an
argument as to why we should ignore them), as well as a depiction of the kind of explanation
at work at the higher level – a non-causal, analytic entailment of an interesting, statistical
sort (and perhaps a unique one in the study of scientific explanation; see Matthen 2009;
Ariew et al 2015).
The second cluster of answers seeks to preserve the causal nature of evolutionary ex-
planations (with some even arguing that this is definitional of selection since the time of
Darwin, e.g., Hodge 1987). Here, the diversity in positions is too large to offer a single
definitive statement of the view, so I will have to be more schematic (and will cite only rep-
resentative instances of the perspectives in play). Causalists first claim that one or both of
the population- (Millstein 2006) or individual-level (Ramsey 2013) explanations offered by
selection is in fact causal, whether via an approach that relies on a causal-process view of
causal explanation (Millstein et al 2009), or by citing the supervenience of the population-
level causal story on that at the individual level (Shapiro and Sober 2007). Further, causalist
authors regularly search for connections between individual-level phenomena and those at
the population level. One common tactic, for instance, is to define trait fitness as the average
of individual fitnesses for all individuals bearing a given trait (though this is not uncontro-
versial; see Sober 2001). Similarly, one might search for connections between individual
lineage change and long-term population change (Pence and Ramsey 2013). In all cases,
though, these approaches are alike in that they wish to consider at least one of the selec-
tive explanations at issue causally, and they wish to ground such a discussion in a careful
consideration of the relationship between populations and individuals.
While there are occasional references back to the history of biology – particularly in
pursuit of a historical precursor such as Darwin (Hodge 1987) or Galton (Ariew et al 2017)
– the debate is commonly thought to begin with the near-simultaneous publication of the
two “founding” statisticalist papers I mentioned above, in 2002. In the nearly twenty years
since, dozens of articles have followed, deepening the analysis of the controversy, staking
out imaginative and interesting positions, but not, it seems, approaching anything like con-
sensus.
It is my aim in this paper to offer two novel and interrelated perspectives on this dis-
cussion. First, I will pick up on a suggestion in my prior work (REDACTED 2015), which
I failed to sufficiently flesh out there: namely, that this debate, far from being a product
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of the twenty-first century, is endemic to statistical approaches to selection – so much so
that it in fact has been with us ever since the first attempts to develop such an approach to
evolution in the 1880s and 1890s. A nuanced reading of the work of W.F.R. Weldon, one
of the leading lights of the “biometrical” school (with Karl Pearson and Francis Galton),
the first group of biologists to attempt to develop an entirely statistical understanding of
natural selection, will show that he struggled with his position on exactly this problem. Be-
ginning his career as a firm believer in the explanatory irrelevance of individual-level facts
for population-level outcomes, Weldon ended it (with his untimely death) in the depths of
the pursuit of connections between the individual-level details of heredity and inheritance
and the population-level phenomena which they give rise to.
Second, and more provocatively, I want to offer a suggestion for a reading of Weldon’s
conversion that offers us a potential way forward in the prolonged and seemingly intractable
debate over the causal structure of evolutionary theory. Weldon’s turn, near the end of his
life, to a discussion of the nature of statistical theorizing itself and the metaphysics of chance
should offer an instructive lesson – it is high time for us to attempt to ground our approach
to the theoretical structure of evolutionary theory in more general concerns.
2 Weldon on Selection, 1893–1906
W.F.R. Weldon (1860–1906), who went by Raphael, was a successful, young field biologist
(specializing in invertebrate zoology) in 1889, when he read Francis Galton’s new work,
Natural Inheritance, the first book to marshal the young discipline of statistics (which Gal-
ton had drawn largely from Adolphe Quetelet) in the service of questions of the relationship
between parents and offspring (Galton 1889). The course of Weldon’s career was quickly
changed. He prepared an initial paper offering a vast collection of measurements of shrimp
and, when this article was eviscerated in peer review by none other than Galton himself
(Weldon 1890a), worked directly with Galton to produce what would become his first con-
tribution to statistical biology (Weldon 1890b).
Galton’s approach to the role of statistics in biology was largely a static one (a feature
which he inherited from Quetelet), with populations expressing normally distributed charac-
ters, and the lack of change in those normal distributions presenting a striking fact about the
living world in need of explanation (to which Galton would add a rather confused picture of
saltationist evolution in order to restore compatibility with Darwinism; Bowler 2014). Wel-
don, in inheriting that approach, was at this point entirely incapable of considering the im-
pact of natural selection in statistical terms, even though understanding evolutionary change
was one of the primary reasons that Weldon had adopted statistical theorizing in the first
place. That would require a more sophisticated mathematical apparatus than Galton could
provide. Luckily, Weldon took up a chair at University College, London, in 1890, which
put him in contact with the mathematician and statistician Karl Pearson. Pearson’s ability
to construct the tools necessary to analyze non-normal distributions would provide just the
leverage Weldon needed in order to think about evolutionary change.
2.1 Early Weldon: The Crabs of 1893 and 1895
The first results of this collaboration came in the two articles for which Weldon is now best
known, both large-scale studies of small crabs found in two populations, one in the sound
at Plymouth, near the Marine Biological Association where Weldon often performed field
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Fig. 1 Weldon’s diagram of Carcinus mænas, adapted from Weldon (1893). Frontal breadth (the asymmetri-
cally distributed character of interest) is the distance here labeled C–D.
work, and one in Naples, at the Zoological Station (Weldon 1893, 1895). In the first paper,
the data were fairly limited, and the conclusions that one could draw from them were limited
in turn. Weldon took 1,000 measurements of a variety of morphological characters in these
crabs, and found that every single one of them was normally distributed (consistent with
Galton’s view), save one measure in the Naples population – frontal breadth (see figure 1).
This character showed a slightly non-normal distribution.
At first using his own sketch of curves by hand via trial-and-error, and later using a
method expressly developed by Pearson for this purpose (Pearson 1895), Weldon factored
that non-normal distribution into the sum of two normal curves. While he recognized that
this hypothesis could not be fully supported by the data which he provided (in particular,
without a much more detailed knowledge of the process of growth in the crabs, which I will
discuss more below), Weldon cautiously proposes that these data could be the signal of nat-
ural selection dividing the population into two distinct sub-populations – the detection, that
is, of incipient speciation in the wild. The 1895 paper is similarly cautious in presentation;
its results appear to demonstrate the influence of stabilizing selection on the frontal breadths
in the Plymouth species.
Neither paper, however, is cautious in its philosophical conclusions. Near the end of the
first, Weldon writes that
before we can properly estimate the changes at present going on in a race or species
we must know accurately (a) the percentage of animals which exhibit a given amount
of abnormality with regard to a particular character; (b) the degree of abnormality
of other organs which accompanies a given abnormality of one; (c) the difference
between the death rate per cent. in animals of different degrees of abnormality with
respect to any organ; (d) the abnormality of offspring in terms of the abnormality of
parents, and vice versâ [sic]. (Weldon 1893, p. 329)
It’s important, I think, to dwell for a moment on just how revolutionary such a pronounce-
ment is. To modernize Weldon’s language a bit, he argues here that in order to understand
evolutionary change, we need to know the distribution of traits, the correlation between
traits, the varying values of trait fitness, and the heritability of differences in traits – an ex-
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tremely modern picture of the foundations of evolutionary theory for 1893, and one that was
entirely unprecedented.
Further, these data were not only necessary to understand the process of evolution but
also, he thought, entirely sufficient, as he made clear at the end of the second paper:
These are all the data which are necessary, in order to determine the direction and
rate of evolution; and they may be obtained without introducing any theory of the
physiological function of the organs investigated. The advantage of eliminating from
the problem of evolution ideas which must often, from the nature of the case, rest
chiefly upon guess-work, need hardly be insisted upon. (Weldon 1895, p. 379)
Again, context is important. The kinds of traits that Weldon was studying – recall that his
example here is a purely morphological character, of no obvious physiological function
(about which more in the next subsection) – were relatable only with difficulty to straight-
forward effects on the organism’s ability to survive and reproduce. But this is no hindrance.
The advent of the statistical method makes such connections between population-level trait
characteristics and properties of individual physiology simply unnecessary.
Early Weldon, then, as of the 1893 and 1895 papers, is a firm advocate of the view
that the details of individual-level physiology and heredity are meaningless for the proper
approach to natural selection, which should instead traffic only in population-level statisti-
cal variables. He therefore adopts the most significant core tenet of the statisticalist view,
namely, the explanatory irrelevance of individual circumstances for statistically described
population trends.
It is important to nuance this conclusion in two ways. First, Weldon remains a dyed-
in-the-wool field zoologist, and hence it would be too hasty to say that he has followed
his own dictates consistently throughout his work. There is always an abiding concern with
uncovering precise causal pathways in Weldon. But I don’t think this gives us a reason to
reject these extremely strident “programmatic” claims that appear in his most important
papers from the early 1890s.
Second, Weldon gives us no argument for why this should be so. To put it simply, the
further implication that the explanation of population change in virtue of differences in
character traits proceeds non-causally doesn’t occur to him. In fact, it seems likely that he
would have, upon reflection, rejected this consequence of the statisticalist picture for which
he appears to be arguing above. When pushed directly on questions of causation by E. Ray
Lankester (in an exchange to which we will return shortly), he begins (in a letter to Nature)
by quoting the definition of causation from Hume’s Inquiry, and continues by arguing that
“when I have spoken of cause and effect, I have always endeavoured to use the words in
accordance with the definition given in this passage or in Kant’s extension of it” (Weldon
1896b, p. 294). It is, of course, unclear to what extent Weldon’s apprehension of causal
inference should be trusted, and these passages, such as they are, were only produced under
duress. Let’s turn now to the circumstances of that duress.
2.2 Middle Weldon: Debates of 1895–1896
As Weldon’s more provocative claims became better known, they began to attract polemical
interest. In response to his 1895 paper (and, particularly, the very portion near the end of
the paper that I cited above), E. Ray Lankester, the well known advocate of Darwinian
gradualism who had taught Weldon at University College, wrote an incredulous letter. In his
opinion, Weldon
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has deliberately departed from the simple statement which his observations war-
ranted, viz. that such-and-such a proportion of frontal measurement accompanies
survival, and has unwarrantably (that is to say unreasonably) proceeded to speak
of the “effect” of this frontal proportion, to declare it to be a cause of survival to
estimate the “advantage” and “disadvantage” of this same proportion, and finally
to maintain that its “importance” may be estimated without troubling ourselves to
inquire how it operates, or whether indeed it is operative at all. (Lankester 1896,
p. 246, original emphasis)
The criticism clearly stung. For what Lankester did not know was that Weldon has, in the in-
tervening time since collecting the data for the 1895 paper, become worried about precisely
these sorts of questions, for a number of reasons.
First and foremost – and as Weldon had in fact clearly noted in the presentation of the
data in both the 1893 and 1895 papers, though interestingly failed to note in the provocative
philosophical conclusions of both papers – he knows that there are multiple ways in which
a change in a character distribution might arise. “A diminution in the frequency of abnormal
frontal breadth, with increasing size of crabs” (that is, the stabilizing selection around the
mean which Weldon found in his 1895 Plymouth sample), he writes in a letter responding to
Lankester, “might be due either to a selective destruction of abnormal crabs during growth,
or to a modification of these crabs, by which abnormal individuals lose their abnormality as
they grow” (Weldon 1896c, p. 413). That is, as I briefly mentioned above, without a clear
knowledge of how these organisms change during the regular process of growth, we cannot
know that any changes in the characters of the crabs that survive to maturity are the result
of destruction by natural selection. Apparent selective bias in survival could simply be the
effect of age-correlated change as the crabs grow.
“In order to decide which of these imaginative hypotheses should be adopted,” Weldon
continues, “I have spent a great part of the last two years in ascertaining the law of growth of
crabs” (Weldon 1896c, p. 413), in a vast experiment involving raising crabs in jars at the lab-
oratory at Plymouth. Such an experiment would, it seems, give knowledge of precisely the
kind of physiological details about the development of crabs which Weldon had written, not
one year before, were entirely unnecessary. Indeed, the contradiction is all the more acute.
Near the end of the very same letter in which he describes his crab-growth experiments, he
writes that
A complete knowledge of the processes associated with this relation between frontal
breadth and death-rate is a thing of very great interest, . . . [but i]t is not necessary
in order that the change in mean frontal breadth may be measured from generation
to generation, and the direction and rate of evolution by this means ascertained.
(Weldon 1896c, p. 413)
Which is it, we would like to ask: is an understanding of the physiological effects and growth
characters of frontal breadths essential for understanding the evolutionary change in that
character, or not? If experimental data are required, is it only the description of the crabs’
growth that matters, or do we also need information about the physiological role of frontal
breadths themselves? Weldon himself seems to be unclear on the matter, stuck in something
of a transitional state.
One might argue here that Weldon’s experiments in crabs are not genuinely on the hunt
for causal influences. Given that he describes them as involving the “relation between frontal
breadth and death-rate,” perhaps he is simply performing a sort of observational study, de-
signed to establish a statistical correlation while controlling for possible confounders?1 Such
1 I thank an anonymous reviewer for mentioning this potential objection.
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an interpretation is belied, however, by his experimental practice – in short, by the kind of
work that he performs in order to approach the question that he lays out above, which would
prove fruitful over the next few years.
2.3 Late Weldon: Adaptation and Heredity from 1898–1906
These experiments, in the two years after the flurry of correspondence with Lankester in
Nature described above, provide Weldon with a mass of data significant enough to push him
out of this transitional state. Both newly conceived experiments on the crabs at Plymouth
Sound along with comparisons of Weldon’s data on female crabs with a colleague’s data on
males, indicate that – even in the short period for which Weldon has been collecting data –
the frontal breadths have been detectably changing. Over just five years, the crabs have lost
several percent in frontal breadth. Even without considering any hypothesis as to the nature
or causes of such change, Weldon is surely right when he claims that “the frontal breadth of
these crabs is diminishing year by year at a rate which is very rapid, compared with the rate
at which animal evolution is commonly supposed to progress” (Weldon 1898, p. 898).
His occasion for making this observation was the Presidential Address of Section D
(Zoology) of the British Association, which Weldon delivered on September 8, 1898, and
which marked the first of two turns that would reshape Weldon’s thought concerning natural
selection – a dramatic leap in his belief that selection was a powerful force for adaptive
change. For the change in frontal breadth is not merely idle. In the late 1890s, Plymouth
Sound is in the process of silting up. The construction of a man-made breakwater prevents
the fine clay which washes down from the rivers above from escaping to the sea, and hence
it settles in the sound, mixed with the refuse of the massive shipping industry there.
Weldon thus tries another round of experiments to investigate the causal role of silt:
“keeping crabs in water containing fine mud in suspension, in order to see whether a se-
lective destruction occurred under these circumstances or not” (Weldon 1898, p. 899). And
indeed, every such experiment demonstrates that crabs which survive in silty water have,
on average, narrower frontal breadths than the crabs that die. He checks for a number of
confounders, confirming on the contrary that (as best his data will allow), crabs kept in per-
fectly clean, silt-free water will tend to have significantly higher mean frontal breadths than
wild-type crabs, and that the action of changes in frontal breadth appears to have something
to do with filtration of the water prior to its reaching the gills. Indeed, the crabs which are
killed, he finds, have their gills coated in a fine layer of silt.
These are not, then, merely experiments attempting to rule out certain kinds of con-
founders for a correlation between frontal breadth and later survival. Weldon has a specific
hypothesis about the importance of a particular causal factor operating at the individual level
– the silting of the harbor as a selective pressure – and he attempts to show directly how this
factor leads to the kind of differential survival that would drive selection. Frontal breadth
remains present in the explanation, but only as an intervening variable. The experiments
are designed precisely to give the causal story for why change in that variable would be
important in the first place.
For Weldon, this changes the tenor of natural selection itself, and shakes his former
belief in the irrelevance of fine-scale details concerning individual characters for the deter-
mination of natural selection. It remains the case that “the whole of the difficulty of the
theory of Natural Selection is a quantitative difficulty.” But, and in contrast to his claims in
1893 and 1895, he continues,
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it is the difficulty of believing that in any given case a small deviation from the
mean character will be sufficiently useful or sufficiently harmful to matter. That is a
difficulty that can only be got rid of by determining in a number of cases how much
a given variation does matter; and I hope I have shown you that such determination
is possible, and, if it be possible, it is our duty to make it. (Weldon 1898, p. 902)
He concludes by repeating a similar list of criteria for determining the impact of evolution
as he had offered in 1895, but they now ring differently in light of his recent experimental
work. When he writes that “we ought to know experimentally how much effect [a] variation
has upon the death-rate” (Weldon 1898, p. 902), we can see that he now means that such
experiments are to involve the painstaking collection of details of individual physiology and
its impact on evolutionary success.
One important objection should be raised here.2 We might see Weldon’s use of these
crabs as nothing more than an expedient place to do some empirical research, capitalizing
on a species available near his field site at Plymouth and amenable to the kind of analy-
sis he was looking to perform at the time. On this view, there’d be no change of broader
philosophical orientation indicated by this work, just an opportunistic study of a useful pop-
ulation. While something in this vicinity is undoubtedly part of Weldon’s motivation, I think
the combination of an increased emphasis on natural selection with the disappearance of
the aggressive, statistics-focused language of Weldon’s earlier work – both of which take
place right around the shift to adaptation in the crabs – are too compelling in combination
to discount a real change in Weldon’s approach to evolution.
The second major shift in Weldon’s thought is a result of the “rediscovery” of the work
of Mendel, which Weldon first reads on October 16, 1900. Less than a month later, we
see in correspondence that Weldon has, as a result, been gripped by worries about another
individual-level influence: the structure of heritable material in individuals and the way in
which it is passed to offspring.3 As he writes to Pearson,
I think that there must be an element in each gamete corresponding to every quality
transmitted by it; some of these may blend with the corresponding elements of the
other, some may exclude corresponding elements of the other, some may make a
patch work resulting in a particulate [what we might call “variegated”] inheritance.
(Weldon 1900)
It is important to note, for readers like us living in a world after the work of R.A. Fisher and
the modern synthesis, that this is not a disguised population inference. There is no infinite
pool of gametes for Weldon, a feature of populations that would blend together and which is
related to future individuals via a sampling process.4 To the extent that sampling is involved
at all, it comes from the finite heritable resources of parents to produce the finite heritable
resources of offspring. This is thus, for Weldon, very much a question of the properties of
individual organisms and the ways in which those properties persist over time through their
lineages.
This would become the central refrain of Weldon’s response to Mendel, and to Mendel’s
defenders, such as Bateson, who endeavored to argue that Weldon’s entire statistical ap-
2 Thanks to Gregory Radick for raising this objection.
3 It is worth noting that, while Weldon’s focus on these questions was intensified in his response to
Mendel’s work, these are ideas that he developed during what I called the “period of transition” in the last
subsection. Many of the basic ideas are present in a letter he writes to Galton in June, 1896 (Weldon 1896a).
4 For a nice reconstruction of these issues in Fisher’s case, see Morrison (2002), though I am less certain
that Morrison’s claims about Pearson’s lack of concern for biological detail would withstand scrutiny, and am
certain that any such claims cannot justly be applied to Weldon.
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A Mean B C
Fig. 2 Weldon’s diagram of Mendelian “characters,” taken from a letter to Pearson (redrawn after Weldon
1902).
proach could not be reconciled with Mendel’s results. What we must do, Weldon claims,
is find a relationship between the various properties of parental and offspring gametes that
would successfully reproduce not only the generalized, statistical theory of inheritance for
which Weldon had been advocating elsewhere, but also the laws of Mendel as a special case:
What Bateson does, and what all Mendelians do, is to take the diagram of frequency
and to call a range AB one “character,” and the range BC another “character” of a
Mendelian pair.
[figure 2]
There must be a simple relation between AB, BC, and the S.D. [standard deviation]
of the original system, which would make the chance that a grandchild falls within
BC = 14 ? (Weldon 1902)
The Mendelians’ failure to appreciate the full diversity of statistically distributed characters
was their downfall. On the contrary, “the proper line of research is an inquiry into those
embryonic stimuli which make a given character evident or latent. That is my fixed belief”
(Weldon 1904).
This would be Weldon’s primary line of research for the rest of his life. As he prepared
for a series of public lectures that he gave at the end of 1904 and the beginning of 1905,5
he began to turn more seriously to the question of the relationship between the underlying
nature of the transmission of hereditary material and expressed phenotypes across multiple
generations, attempting to derive a number of different laws for the transmission of character
traits that he believed were found in the chromosomes.
As he put the point in a draft manuscript for a book based on those lectures, left un-
finished at the time of his death, a purely Galtonian theory of inheritance – Galton had
only attempted to gesture by vague analogy at the process of character transmission and
the difference between characters that were expressed or merely latent – would not suffice.
“The knowledge of cell-structure attained in 1872 [when Galton wrote out his mature the-
ory of inheritance] did not make it possible to go beyond the suggestions indicated by such
an analogy: we shall see in a future chapter how far the suggestion made can be brought
into harmony with the facts of germinal structure which have been discovered during the
last thirty years” (Weldon 1905c, ch. 2, f. 67r). Unfortunately, this “future chapter” of the
manuscript was never written.
Thus, then, concludes Weldon’s great shift: from a firm believer in the explanatory ir-
relevance of individual-level phenomena for evolutionary change, to a biologist fully en-
5 A series of anonymous accounts of the content of these lectures was published in The Lancet; see issues
beginning with Weldon (1905a). (I follow common practice in citing them under Weldon’s name as the
lecturer; the author of the accounts is unknown, even to the journal’s editors [pers. comm.].)
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gaged in both the search for physiological foundations for evolutionary changes, as well as
for connections between the properties of individual parent- and offspring-gametes and the
long-term dynamics of evolving populations. In short: from a statisticalist to a causalist.6
2.4 Why the Change?
It is dangerous to speculate about the motivations of historical actors. Weldon, in particular,
left precious little documentary evidence. Much of what we know about the details of his
research and his tribulations with Bateson and others comes as a result of Pearson’s penchant
for saving every scrap of correspondence which he ever received. But it would be equally
irresponsible not to offer some possible reasons that Weldon could have made this move, at
the time and in the way that he did.
First, we might point to a general phenomenon “in the air” in late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth century life science: an increasing preoccupation with the practical application of
inheritance to breeding and horticulture. This concern – widely acknowledged by historians
of science (Vicedo 1995; Hodge 2009) – was explicitly discussed by Weldon in a manuscript
dating from 1905. He has begun to realize that, given his view of inheritance, “you cannot,
by any amount of selection, reduce the original variability of a race beyond a certain definite
amount” (Weldon 1905b, f. 24). If one’s goal is to produce stable lines for agricultural
purposes, this means that we have a task: “Accordingly, in every generation of” a population
that we want to hold stable, “the variability has to be reduced, though the mean is no longer
changed, by a selective destruction” (Weldon 1905b, f. 27). Understanding the nature of
natural selection, in Weldon’s new individualistic and inheritance-focused manner, can help
us understand just how powerful that stabilizing selection needs to be.
Of course, this is late Weldon, well after the shift that I have identified in 1898. His view,
as I have presented it here, of the importance of underlying causal detail to natural selection
is indeed entailed by this approach to tackling the question of variation in agricultural pro-
ductions – that is, one wouldn’t think of the agricultural world in this way if one didn’t have
a causal approach to selection itself. But it’s not implausible that Weldon’s interest might
have been drawn to questions in agricultural breeding and the production of stable types for
independent reasons, and, recognizing this entailment, Weldon then had further reason to
embrace a causal understanding of the process of natural selection.
There is one more possible motivation for Weldon’s shift from statisticalism to causal-
ism, but I want to return to it after pausing to consider a pair of objections which have, by
now, surely occurred to a number of readers.
2.5 Two Objections: On Whiggish History and Traits
Surely, a motivated objector would have already noted, this is nothing more than the worst
type of Whig history: the attempt to read into biologists of the late-nineteenth century a
twenty-first century problem which they could not have understood, much less contributed
to.
6 An anonymous reviewer notes that this makes for a significant difference between Weldon and his close
colleague and collaborator Pearson, who had argued on the contrary that the concept of cause is meaningless
and to be replaced by something like functional or statistical dependence (Pearson 1900). Indeed, the two
men differed significantly in their conceptions of causation, a disagreement which appears clearly, among
other places, in the correspondence pages of Nature, and which I have described elsewhere (REDACTED
2015, under contract).
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One facet of the objection is certainly entirely correct. The philosophical sophistication
surrounding questions of causal and non-causal explanations today is simply incommensu-
rable with the state of such questions in the late-nineteenth century. Nothing like the clarity
of the Salmon-Dowe account of causal processes, appealed to by Millstein (2013), or the
custom-tailored account of statistically abstractive explanation deployed by Matthen (2009),
could conceivably have been available to Weldon.
But to take this fact as a dismissal, tout court, of the applicability of Weldon’s careful
theorizing to the contemporary question of the causal structure of evolutionary theory is too
quick. The question of the relationship between explanations at different levels of the bi-
ological hierarchy is not exactly an esoteric one – nor is it at all exclusive to evolutionary
theory, as it arises in any context in which we have a “multi-level” theory with interconnect-
ing relationships of causation and explanation.7
It is thus not at all surprising that the very first pioneers of statistical methodology in
evolution would have had carefully worked-out positions on the question. Pearson was a
respected author in what we would now gladly call philosophy of science; his Grammar
of Science was eagerly read by a young Einstein, and the relationship of the philosophical
picture he develops there with Mach’s positivism is by now well known (Sloan 2000; Radick
2011; Pence 2011).
Rather than Whig history, then, I would argue that what we have here is instead a case
of biologists quickly and readily seeing a central question in the interpretation of the kind
of theory that they were in the process of developing, if today’s philosophers of science will
only pay attention to their thoughts on the matter.
A second objection might run something like this: Yes, you’ve successfully managed to
detect a change in Weldon’s position. But you’re mistaken if you think that the final position
of the late Weldon maps in any way onto that of the causalists – because, rather than the
new lower level that Weldon alights upon being that of the individual, it’s something more
like traits or genotypes in a contemporary sense. So while there may be a version of a multi-
level explanation problem here, it is not the classic one identified with the causalists and
statisticalists, because it has one of the levels wrong.8
I’ve already given part of a reply to this objection above, but it bears repeating, because
it’s so foreign to anyone who has learned contemporary population genetics. It’s important
not to conflate Weldon’s picture of inheritance with that which would arise in the wake of the
modern synthesis. Weldon’s view of the nature of heritable material (he never settled on a
name for it, using terms like ‘gemmules’ or ‘factors’) is taken wholesale from Galton. They
are physical characteristics of individual organisms,9 encompassing both “patent” characters
(those actually expressed) and “latent” characters (those not actually expressed, taken to
account for the phenomena of occasional reversion to characters borne by distant ancestors).
The process by which the transmission of these characters occurred was as yet unknown to
Weldon, as was the relationship between those characters and early cell biology (two failings
which Weldon hoped to soon remedy); he could only argue that it was clear that their relative
position within the organism was essential to the development of characters from them. But
they remain a finite number of properties of individuals passed on to their offspring.
Put differently, we have here on the one hand nothing like a population characteris-
tic – no gene pools, no indefinitely large numbers of gametes. We also have, on the other
7 While this is not the right context to explore the connection in detail, it is quite similar, for instance, to
the question of “universality” in statistical physics; see Batterman (1998, 2000).
8 Thanks to Marshall Abrams for raising this objection.
9 For a delightful recounting of the debate between Galton and Maxwell over their physical nature, see
Radick (2011).
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hand, nothing like a “genotypic” level. The emphasis for Weldon is always on the “embry-
onic stimuli” (as quoted above) that would lead to some particular character’s developing
(becoming patent) or not (remaining latent) in a particular, individual organism. The distri-
bution of these characters and the statistical laws governing their transmission would remain
a topic of research for Weldon in his last few years of life; Pearson would later publish a
posthumously reconstructed version of these notes (Pearson 1908). In short, for Weldon,
inherited factors set the scope of possibilities available to individual development; it would
have made no sense for him to think about their inheritance except within the context of
individual organisms and individual parent-offspring relationships.10
3 From 1906 to 2021
So much for the paper’s first goal. If I have succeeded, you are hopefully convinced that
Weldon was fully aware of the question in the interpretation of a newly statistical evolution-
ary theory that we have recently taken to calling the causalist/statisticalist debate. It is now
time to pick up on the paper’s second aim, and a thread I left open above: drawing from
Weldon’s second reason for changing from a statisticalist to a causalist picture some morals
for how we might move forward on this debate in our own day.
In 1905, Weldon delivered a lecture at Oxford that would also serve as a contribution
to a volume on the methodology of science (Weldon 1906). After having been one of the
leading disciples of statistical methods in the life sciences for some twenty years, in this
work he takes a step back and considers the reasons for which we might introduce chance
and statistical methods into the life sciences in the first place. While the paper has much
to offer (including Weldon’s favorite demonstration of the nature of regression, involving a
series of thousands of dice-throws tabulated by his wife Florence), for my purposes I want
to zoom in on a contrast that he draws between the physical sciences and the life sciences,
along with his concluding thoughts on the relationship between statistics and experiment.
Turning to another favorite example, he describes the experiments of Lord Rayleigh
which led to the discovery of argon. Rayleigh, in measuring the densities of atmospheric
gases, was persistently left with a remainder which he could not eliminate, despite the col-
lection of further data and the utmost precision in measurement. Being certain, then, that
the measurement represented a real phenomenon, if one that was as-yet inexplicable, he be-
came convinced that there must be another gas at work – which would come to be isolated
as argon.
Weldon astutely realizes that, appearances perhaps to the contrary, the step of genius
here is not the inference to the presence of a new gas. Rather, it is Rayleigh’s ability to
be certain that, rather than experimental error, imprecise measuring equipment, or failure
of the experimenter, the residual mass that he cannot account for is indeed a real physical
phenomenon which cries out, at least in some way, for explanation.
Put differently, physical scientists, when they use statistical method, can use it as though
it is a genuine law of error, quantifying the extent to which our (ever human) imprecise and
imperfect measurements are approximations to some unknown, but still genuinely extant,
real quantity which lies beyond them. Such was Quetelet’s astronomically derived use of
statistics that grounded his search for the “average man” (Quetelet 1835).
10 Morrison notes quite accurately that this is one reason that the mathematics of parent-offspring transmis-
sion remained intractable for the biometricians, and, by extension, one of the reasons that Pearson remained
unable theoretically to separate genetic variation into its different sources, a feat that was much easier for
Fisher (Morrison 2004, p. 1199).
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Biologists, however, have not been so lucky. As Weldon puts it,
[W]hile astronomers, chemists, and physicists have by great and successful efforts
reduced the limits of uncertainty concerning the results of their observations until for
many purposes they can neglect the discrepancies between the results of individual
experiments, and treat their experience as uniform, biologists have not yet gone so
far, and they are still forced to base such general statements as they can make on the
characters of long series of observations. (Weldon 1906, p. 96)
How can biologists hope to catch up with their colleagues in the physical sciences? Per-
haps the most important approach involves the elucidation of the laws that connect individ-
ual hereditary transmissions to broad population change. He offers us several exemplars of
progress in this direction – alluding, as well, to his own work in the book manuscript we
have already encountered. The first is what he calls “Weismann’s theory of the mechanism,
if I may use that word for want of a better, by which characters are transmitted from parent
to offspring” (Weldon 1906, p. 99). Weismann’s theory looks like a set of underlying causal
laws that might ground one sort of statistical transmission, which Weldon introduces here
by way of one of his experiments involving correlated tosses of red and white dice. The dice
experiment is “still more closely analogous,” he writes, “to the relation indicated as a result
of direct statistical study of inheritance by Mr. Francis Galton” (Weldon 1906, p. 100) –
which, as we also have seen above, is essentially Weldon’s own.
He closes the discussion of statistical methodology with, as he puts it, “a word to show
you the kind of general statement to which work of this kind seems to lead” (Weldon 1906,
p. 108). What we should hope for, in the end, is the guidance of statistics in showing us
“how much we can predict about any group of unborn animals from a mere study of one
parent.” He continues: “By such a study, we learn some of the conditions on which the char-
acters of the young depend: if we examine both parents, we learn more of these conditions;
if we study not only the parents but the grandparents we learn still more; and so on” (Wel-
don 1906, p. 108). When asked to point out the most promising general sort of results to
which statistical investigation of inheritance might lead, then, Weldon appeals to the utility
of statistics in guiding our further experimental study of the character traits that are impor-
tant for (selective, and other) biological explanations. “I can only hope,” he concludes, “that
I have helped you to realize a little of the difficulty which besets this form of experimental
inquiry, and the way in which some part of this may be met and overcome” (Weldon 1906,
p. 109).
Of course, this is not necessarily a research program that Weldon would himself have
carried out. We have caught an empirical biologist at one of his most philosophical moments,
and thus conclusions we draw here should be taken as “Weldonian” at best. His death, then,
in 1906 at the age of 46 makes it impossible even to see what kind of empirical work he
might have gone on to produce. But at the very least, Weldon seems to argue that we were
due to rethink the fundamentals of the application of statistics to evolutionary theory. We can
see him reaching, here, for a level of philosophical clarity that was broadly unavailable to
him. The effort, I believe, still offers us a useful message about how we might move forward
in today’s causalist/statisticalist debate.
Weldon and Pearson had been locked for some twenty years in an unending effort to
apply biological case studies in order to determine the theoretical structure of evolution by
natural selection. Their correspondence is littered with data and diagrams, from shrimp to
snails, poppies to Daphnia, basset hounds to racehorses. The contemporary literature has, in
at least some quarters, followed suit (a different species of snails even reappears in Millstein
2008).
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Faced with the apparent intractability of the same problem in 1906, and pushed by the
nature of the lecture series to which he was contributing to consider the problem more theo-
retically, Weldon took a step back, drawing links with other sciences (particularly the phys-
ical sciences), and attempted to generalize the problem to questions of the invocation of
statistical method itself and the various possible structures that statistical theories might
take – one would not, I think, be far off to term this an effort at the metaphysics of sci-
ence. It is this Weldonian suggestion, I claim, that we should take seriously in the context of
the contemporary debate. One response – and one so far not often taken in the philosophy
of biology literature – would be to investigate ways in which both fruitful analogies with
other sciences and fruitful connections with the metaphysics of science could allow us to
build forward momentum on a problem that has been stalled (at least in the contemporary
context) for nearly two decades (REDACTED in press).
4 Conclusion
Let’s take stock. First, for the historical case. We have a number of biologists – here ex-
emplified by the early Weldon, but also equally well demonstrated by parts of Fisher’s
work,11 among others – who are deeply invested in the irrelevance of individual-level facts
for population-level explanations. Other biologists – here exemplified by the late Weldon,
but also equally well demonstrated by Wright,12 among others – are deeply invested in the
search for physiological grounding and interconnections between individual- and population-
level evolutionary phenomena. To make the case for my first main claim, then, this question
has been important to evolutionary theory from the very first days of “statisticalized” evolu-
tionary science.13
To connect more clearly with the contemporary debate, let’s return to a recent presen-
tation of the statisticalist position which I briefly mentioned at the start of the paper, Walsh
et al (2017). One of the defining characteristics of statisticalism, as its adherents argue there,
is the substrate neutrality of models of natural selection. “The conditions for applying [a
population-genetics model] may be realized in biological populations, but virtually noth-
ing of what makes a biological population biological is explicitly represented in the model”
(Walsh et al 2017, p. 11). On the contrary, these models only appeal to the statistical prop-
erties of the populations to which they are taken to apply. At first glance – echoing, I think,
his early-career commitment to precisely this claim – we see a nearly identical argument
advanced by Weldon. Again from his late, unfinished book manuscript:
A descriptive statement of the relation between the visible somatic characters of par-
ents and those of children involves no biological hypothesis whatever, and requires
no peculiarly biological methods for its compilation. When we compare the distri-
bution of statures in two races of men. . . we have to compare two sets of objects
11 In one of his first papers now taken to establish the Modern Synthesis, Fisher writes that “if a complete
analysis is unattainable it is also unnecessary to practical progress. [. . . ] A number of points of general interest
are shown to flow from purely statistical premises” (Fisher 1922, p. 415).
12 In response to Fisher on dominance, Wright focuses on the special cases required for Fisher’s conclu-
sions to go through, arguing that in the absence of them, rather than being supported by statistical principles,
“probably most geneticists would hold that dominance in general has some immediate physiological expla-
nation” (Wright 1929, p. 277).
13 It is also, interestingly, largely independent from the classic “debate between biometry and Mendelism”
framing which has so dominated both historical and philosophical presentations of Pearson and Weldon.
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which differ in length; and the only thing we ought to consider while we are mak-
ing the comparison is the number of inches. . . which each of these objects contains.
(Weldon 1905c, ch. 1, f. 4r)
As classic an invocation of substrate neutrality as one could hope to find in a contemporary
article: what counts here is the statistical distribution of characters, and “it does not matter in
the least whether the objects measured are men” or something else entirely (Weldon 1905c,
ch. 1, f. 4r).
But we should not rest here – thus Weldon moves through the same narrative in his
text that, I argue, he moved through in his thought more generally: “After we have made
our comparison. . . , we ought to remember that we have been measuring men, and look for
something in the phenomena of human development which may help us to see the process
by which the observed relation between parental and filial stature has been brought about”
(Weldon 1905c, ch. 1, f. 4r). As we saw in section 2.3, for the late, post-Mendel Weldon
this will have much to do with the underlying nature of the determinants that give rise to
these traits. For example, it is only by exploring the nature of those determinants that we
will be able to distinguish between the possibility of Darwinian, gradualist natural selec-
tion and saltationist, non-Darwinian selection. Galton, as briefly noted above, had opted for
saltationism, but Weldon noted that careful analysis of the role of these hereditary elements
could settle the question either way:
If the determinant elements. . . are supposed to pass from one generation to another
without any other variation except that involved in the assumption of the dominant
or latent condition, then. . . the appearance of a new character must on such a view
be ascribed to a process other than that of normal inheritance, leading to a “muta-
tion” or “sport.” If, however, the characters of each determinant may be assumed to
vary to any extent, however slight, . . . a gradual production of new characters. . . may
conceivably result from a normal process of inheritance. . . . (Weldon 1905c, ch. 2,
f. 66r)
No substrate-neutrality here, after all. In order to obtain such knowledge of the nature of
natural selection, “we require to know the nature of the determinant elements themselves”
(Weldon 1905c, ch. 2, f. 66r). A complete understanding of natural selection, for Weldon,
requires a causal-experimental perspective on evolving systems in addition to a statistical
one.
Given its venerable status in evolutionary theorizing, then, we can further note that de-
spite more than a century’s progress in both biological and philosophical theorizing, this
issue persistently fails to be resolved. Some of the reasons that this failure might have been
expected have been alluded to here. This is not simply a question of how to interpret a few
isolated patches of biological data. For that matter, the question is not even exclusive to the
biological sciences, recurring in any case in which a theoretical structure like that of evolu-
tion – multiple levels connected compositionally, but with explanations occurring on both
levels14 – is found. How might we proceed?
The paper’s second, and more schematic, thesis is that we might pick up on a suggestion
which Weldon himself left us, and pursue in a systematic way both these connections with
other sciences and generalized resources from the metaphysics of science. Very often, while
certain kinds of surface-level analogies with statistical mechanics are, for instance, proposed
14 In addition to the analogy with physics mentioned above, I also lack both the space here and the expertise
to pursue the similarity between this structure and that of the philosophy of mind; the only attempt, to my
knowledge, to do so is Shapiro and Sober (2007).
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in the course of this debate, such analogies are not pursued in detail – for example, there is
effectively no engagement to be found with the extensive literature in the philosophy of
statistical physics – and hence such connections shed very little philosophical light on the
problem at issue. When concerns in metaphysics are discussed at all, they are raised by
implication or analogy rather than approached in general.
While I lack the space here to detail this project in full (see REDACTED in press for
the complete case) a more engaged, dialectical connection with the literature in the meta-
physics of science, whereby philosophers of biology take an active role in contributing to the
analysis of the kinds of metaphysical questions about causation and multi-level explanation
that could plausibly advance our understanding of this entire cluster of phenomena, would
serve, I argue, as a way in which to take a true late-Weldonian approach to the philosophy
of contemporary biology. Let’s not let Weldon have changed his mind in vain.
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